

# Key Ideas: UL 4600 Safety Standard for Autonomous Vehicles

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## **Overview**



- UL 4600 standard for AV safety cases
  - Fully autonomous vehicles
  - Issued April 2020
  - How to contribute to the next version
- Key 4600 ideas:
  - System-level safety case provides direction
  - Vehicle as well as infrastructure and lifecycle processes all matter
  - Safety metrics used for feedback loops
  - Third party component interface protects proprietary info
  - 4600 helps you know that you've done enough work on safety



# **Goal Based Approach**



- Traditional safety standards are prescriptive
  - "Here is how to do safety" (process, work products)
    - ISO 26262, ISO/PAS 21448, IEC 61508, MIL-STD 882, etc.
- UL 4600 is goal based
  - "Here is what a safety case should address"
    - Do NOT prescribe any particular engineering approach
      - » Use other safety standards within the safety case context
  - Standard for how to assess a safety case
    - Minimum coverage requirement (what goes in the safety case?)
    - Properties of a well-formed safety case
    - Objective assessment criteria



# **Example 4600 Clause**



- 12.3.1 V&V shall provide acceptable coverage of safety related faults associated with the design phase.
- 12.3.1.1 MANDATORY:
  - a) Systematic design defects
  - b) Design consideration of faults, corruption, data loss, and integrity loss in sensor data
  - c) Requirement gaps/omissions and requirement defects
  - d) Response to violation of requirement assumptions

**EXAMPLE:** Response to exceptional operational environment

- e) Identification and description of the intended ODD
- f) Acceptable mitigation of aspects of the defined fault model for each component and other aspect of the item

#### 12.3.1.2 REQUIRED:

a) Maintenance procedure definitions


**NOTE:** While maintenance occurs during the lifecycle, the definition of procedures needs to correspond to design requirements and assumptions made in design regarding maintenance.

- b) Operational procedure definitions (including startup and shutdown) and operational modes
- c) Faults, corruption, data loss, and integrity loss in data from external sources
- d) Faults and failures associated with exceptional conditions that impair risk reduction functionality
- e) Hardware and software errata and other third-party component design defects
- f) Other faults in safety related functions, component designs, and other designed properties
- 12.3.1.3 HIGHLY RECOMMENDED N/A
- 12.3.1.4 RECOMMENDED N/A

### 12.3.1.5 CONFORMANCE:

Conformance is checked via inspection of design and V&V evidence.

# **Flexible Approaches**



Each identified hazard shall be given a criticality level and assigned an initial risk assuming the absence of mitigation.

#### 6.4.1.1 MANDATORY:

a) Hazard Log records criticality level and initial risk for each hazard

#### 6.4.1.2 REQUIRED:

- a) Use of at least one of the following risk evaluation approaches:
  - 1) Risk table
  - 2) Risk equation (weighted probability times severity)
  - 3) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
  - 4) Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
  - 5) Preliminary Item Safety Assessment (PSSA)
  - 6) Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA)
  - 7) Bowtie diagram
  - 8) System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP)
  - 9) Field engineering feedback
  - 10) Other relevant risk evaluation approaches
- b) Use of integrity level and related techniques

**EXAMPLES:** Integrity level and related techniques from ISO 26262, IEC 61508; development assurance level from DO-178

#### **HIGHLY RECOMMENDED:**


a) Use of integrity levels defined in an accepted domain-relevant functional safety standard

**NOTE:** It might not be practical to use such integrity levels for all aspects of an autonomous systems, but it is highly recommended to do so to the extent reasonable.

# **Safety Case**



- Claim a property of the system
  - "System avoids pedestrians"
- Argument why this is true
  - "Detect & maneuver to avoid"
- Evidence supports argument
  - Tests, analysis, simulations, ...
- Sub-claims/arguments address complexity
  - "Detects pedestrians" // evidence
  - "Maneuvers around detected pedestrians" // evidence
  - "Stops if can't maneuver" // evidence



# **4600 Safety Case Scope**



- Everything needed to independently assess safety
  - Hazards and mitigation approaches
  - Claims traced: arguments to evidence



## Scope includes:

- Technology: HW/SW, machine learning, tools, ...
- Lifecycle: deployment, operation, incidents, maintenance, ...
- Infrastructure: vehicle, roads, data networks, cloud computing, ...
- Road users: pedestrians, light mobility, emergency responders, ...
- Environment: Operational Design Domain (ODD) definition
- ... and more ...

# **Example ODD Prompts (§8.2.2)**



## Behavioral rules

- EXAMPLES: Traffic laws, vehicle path conflict resolution priority, local customs, justifiable rule breaking for safety
- Compliance strategy of traffic rules and regulations
  - EXAMPLE: Enumeration of applicable traffic regulations and corresponding ego vehicle behavioral constraints



- Vulnerable populations including number, density, and types
  - EXAMPLES: Pedestrians, motorcycles, bikes, scooters, other vulnerable road users, other road users
- Special road user rules, if applicable
  - EXAMPLES: Bicycles, motorcycles, lane splitting, interacting with construction vehicles, oversize vehicles, snowplows, sand/salt trucks, emergency response vehicles, street sweepers, horse-drawn vehicles
- Seasonal effects
  - EXAMPLES: Foliage changes (e.g., leaves (dis) appearing), sun angle changes, seasonal behavioral patterns (e.g., summer beach traffic), seasonally-linked events (Oktoberfest, regatta crowds, fireworks gatherings, air shows)

## **SPI Metrics**



- Safety Performance Indicator (SPI)
  - Like a KPI, but specific to safety
  - Provides metrics on safety case validity

## ■ SPI measures:

- Behavior metrics for safety-related behaviors
  - E.g.: Acceptable violation rate of standoff to pedestrians
- Assumption validity within safety case
  - E.g.: Tolerates gaps of up to X meters in lane markings
  - E.g.: Correlated camera and lidar false negative rate
- Any other metrics that validate safety case



# **Feedback Loops**




- Rather than assume perfection...
  - ... manage & improve imperfections
  - Feedback data incorporated in safety case
  - Convert "unknowns" into "knowns" over time
- Feedback loops for continuous improvement
  - Implementation faults
  - Design faults
  - Gaps in simulations, analysis tools, ...
  - Gaps in Operational Design Domain
  - Gaps in machine learning training data



# **Elements out of Context (EooC)**



- Reused or 3<sup>rd</sup> party system "component"
  - Similar in spirit to ISO 26262 SEooC
  - Hardware, software, sensor, map data, ...
- EooC has a safety case fragment
  - Vendor need not expose that safety case
  - Instead, provides an interface containing:
    - Properties & characteristics
    - Assumptions that system must honor
    - Fault model used for assessment
    - 4600 clause coverage (might be partial)
    - Assessment report



# **Complementing Other Standards**



- ISO 26262, MIL-STD 882, etc.: potential starting points
  - Still useful where applicable
- ISO/PAS 21448 etc. for scenarios
  - Design and validation process framework
  - SaFAD and emerging standards
- 4600 has #DidYouThinkofThat? lists
  - Initial safety case coverage
  - Learn from experience: yours; others
  - Objective assessment criteria for safety case



# **Other Key Points**



- Self-certification is permitted
  - Internal assessor permitted; no external "certificate" requirement
- Only necessary technical mitigations required
  - "Does not apply to this system" and "Outside ODD" are OK
  - Can use non-technical mitigations
- Underwriters Laboratories is a non-profit SDO
  - Voting committee (STP) has diverse representation
  - Continuous Maintenance process provides timely updates
- Does 4600 conflict with ISO 26262 or ISO/PAS 21448?
  - No
- What if you can't afford to buy a copy?
  - Issued standard is <u>free to browse</u> ("digital view") on-line in its entirety: <a href="https://www.shopulstandards.com/ProductDetail.aspx?productid=UL4600">https://www.shopulstandards.com/ProductDetail.aspx?productid=UL4600</a>

UL 4600

STANDARD FOR SAFETY

**Evaluation of Autonomous Products** 

# **Review of Key Ideas**




- System-level safety case provides direction
  - Highlights gaps in evidence and arguments
- Vehicle, infrastructure, and lifecycle processes all matter
  - If safety case depends upon it, that makes it safety related
- Metrics combine with feedback loops
  - Operational feedback will be essential for practical safety
- Third party component interface to protect proprietary info
  - EooC interface permits separate component assessment
- 4600 helps you know that you've done enough safety work
  - Robust prompts and pitfalls capture best practice/lessons learned

# **Next Steps**



- 4600 provides:
  - Guidance on building safety case
  - Robust minimum criteria
  - Emphasis on ability to assess validity
- You can get involved!
  - More info on 4600:
    - https://edge-case-research.com/ul4600/
  - Teams already working toward adoption
  - Participate in the 2020 update cycle
    - Stakeholders can submit comments (free)
    - Register with: Deborah.Prince@ul.org







EDGE CASE RESEARCH
WE DELIVER THE PROMISE OF AUTONOMY